

The Sufi Orders in a Modernizing Empire: 1808 – 1876

E. Melek Cevahirođlu Ömür

Abstract

This study presents the transformed relationship between the state and the Sufi orders in the Ottoman Empire as the outcome of its affiliation with the modernization process in the nineteenth century. The study focuses on the institutionalization of the Ottoman Sufis and the state regulations regarding them, and it aims to provide a survey of how the state attempted to amend the Sufi orders. The reforms introduced by Sultan Mahmud II are discussed, and this investigation is complemented by analysis of the regulations of the *Tanzimat*. The study concludes that the income level of the *tekkes* was drastically reduced and the privileged status of the Sufi orders eroded through two particular decrees.

Key Words The Sufi Orders, The Ottoman Empire, transformation, modernization, the *Tanzimat*, Sultan Mahmud, *Meclis- i Meşayih*, sheikh, dervish, *tekkes*, sultan, Bektashi, lodge.

1. The Role and the Situation of the Sufi Orders up to the Period of the Tanzimat

The Ottoman Empire inaugurated and intensified efforts to incorporate administrative reforms that the Russians and Austro-Hungarians had recently brought into their governmental arsenal. The intention of these reforms was the revitalization of the Ottoman Empire. In this context, Islam was treated by the reformers as a significant influence on Ottoman society, which they desired to maintain and amplify.¹ In this sense, the governmentality of the Ottoman Empire was incorporated into a state mechanism, which was concerned with the complex composition of men and things related to men, rather than territorial governance. People's associations, relations, and the personal sphere became a concern of the state. The Sufi orders, which contributed to the qualifications of human beings and thus the society, are one example of this. The aim of this paper is to discuss the attempts to reform the Sufi Orders in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century, with special emphasis on the years between 1808 and 1876, under the new regulation of Ottoman governmentality. The reforms introduced during this period were long-term and relatively successful for the empire in the processes of bureaucratization and modernization. Particularly

the military and civil reforms of this period have been of crucial importance in the history of Islam and the Sufi Orders. Beginning with the *Nizam-ı Cedid* under Sultan Selim III (r. 1789-1807), and continuing with the *Tanzimat* following the new regulations under Sultan Mahmud (r. 1808-1839), these reforms, which played a considerable role in the modernization process, in both the provinces and the center of the Empire.

Since the time span of this study excludes the reign of Selim III, I will concentrate on the reforms of Sultan Mahmud, which can be considered in two major fields: the modernization of the military which ended with the suppression of the janissaries in 1826; and the re-organization of the financial resources of the state, particularly the administration of the waqfs. In both fields, the Sufi orders were affected, and this paper focuses on the level of influence and the material effects of these reforms in the Sufi Orders. These mystical institutions were not only affected by the abolishment of the janissaries, but also by the re-organization of the waqfs. The reforms resulted in negative consequences for the orders, and a decline in their fortunes compared to their previous conditions. The reforms of the nineteenth century undermined the traditional role of the dervish institution in the Ottoman Empire, especially for the *tekkes* and the *tariqas*. The beginning of the changes in the Sufi Orders was the suppression and the termination of the Bektashi Order in 1826, after the abolishment of the janissaries. Nevertheless, Sultan Mahmud had given the first signs of change when he declared his reform decrees, which focused on the administration of the Sufi Orders in 1812 and 1818. In this respect, it is safe to claim that Sultan Mahmud's reforms made important impressions on the practices and general structures of the Sufi orders.

2. The Re-Organization of the Sufi Orders under Mahmud II

The key events of the nineteenth century, such as the Reform Edicts of the *Tanzimat* in 1834, the *Islahat* in 1856 and the Constitution in 1876 resulted in economic, religious, social and cultural transformations. The *Vilayet* laws in 1864 and 1868 were designed to implement reforms at the administrative and provincial levels. These have been seen as part of a concentrated period and process of reforming legislation called the *Tanzimat*, which took place during the reigns of Sultan Mahmud's sons Abdülmecid (r. 1839-1861) and Abdülaziz (r. 1861-1876), and achieved its final culmination during the long reign of Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1909), who, in many ways, was one of the great Ottoman modernizers.² The reforms' imperative was to bind the government to a policy of change, greater justice, the rule of law as well as economic improvements.

In comparison to the tangential reforms enacted by his predecessors, the reign of Mahmud II and its reforms caused fundamental and profound changes in the administration of the state. The influence of the European powers and the internal disputes required both administrative and military reforms. Naturally, the European institutions were used as models, but were ultimately implemented as a synthesis indigenous to the Ottomans, rather than being adopted in their original forms.³

Mahmud II, the successor of Selim III (r. 1789-1807), was well aware of the fact that direct and immediate implementation of the reforms was the way to eliminate the weaknesses of the Ottoman sultanate and pave the way for a better rule. In this respect, based on the lessons taken from the reign of Selim III, Mahmud II spent the first decade of his reign by consolidating his power and dominion over the branches of the state and the perception of its officials. Therefore, Mahmud's reforms were evaluated in the sense that his statesmanship succeeded in a substantial reform of the empire and set the stage for absolutism during the later years of his reign.⁴

Sultan Mahmud began his reforms in the military, into which the French army system was introduced. He also wanted to reform the system of taxation. The *tumar* system had already been replaced by the *iltizam* (tax farm) system in the 16th century due to corruption, and requests for improved security in the provinces and administration of agricultural lands. The tax-farming system was later transformed into a more abusive form of tenancy known as *malikane* (life farm) in 1695.⁵ This seemed more advantageous than the *iltizam*, although its positive initial results gave way to an increased tax burden on the shoulders of the financial system, since the life farms were devolved to the second, even to the third, hand *mültezimler* (life farmers).⁶ Mahmud continued his modifications to the taxation system which he inherited from Selim III, and expended great effort to terminate the autonomous and powerful role of the provincial elites over the state and signed the *Sened-i Ittifak*⁷ with the *ayans* (provincial notables) in 1808. His attempts were successful in the long run, when he later started to establish his absolute regime after the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812. Afterwards, the janissaries and the recruits provided by local fief holders were eliminated in 1826,⁸ and this provided the starting point for the successful execution of military and administrative reforms. As Mehmet Seyittanlıoğlu points out, 1826 marks the beginning of the *Tanzimat* era.⁹

During Mahmud's reign, civil service tuition was improved and better salaries provided a more efficient administration, reducing the need for graft. At the end of the seventeenth century, the empire was suffering from a stagnation of territorial extension and a financial shortage (inflation), and economic and taxation reforms were crucial to reverse the financial

deterioration. Further enhancements were made with the improvement of taxation, which eliminated ineffective collection methods and improved revenues for the state. However, *malikane* remained the major method of tax collection until it was abolished during the *Tanzimat*.¹⁰ Throughout these reforms, the sultan undertook vigorous endeavors to establish an efficient central control over the entire empire, establishing his rule as “enlightened despot.” For instance, he promulgated a decree about men’s headgear, which was the replacement of the traditional turban with the red fez with black tassel. The traditional turban was a common component of everyday life, ceremonial dress and an essential piece of dervish clothing, which was even represented on their gravestones. Therefore, Mahmud’s affiliation to the project of modernization, with its hope of silencing social distinctions, was repressive since the dervish culture had previously been exempted from this kind of restriction on life within the *tekkes* and the activities of the sheikhs. In fact, Mahmud II was not the only ruler to attempt to administer the Sufi Orders. Muhammed Ali, the Ottoman viceroy in Egypt, decreed that authority over the Egyptian Sufi orders, lodges and shrines was to be held by the *sheikh al-sajjada* (the newly created position granted authority over all other sheikhs).¹¹

Mahmud II made enthusiastic efforts in order to curtail religious powers in the empire with the help of modernization processes, which began at the end of the seventeenth century. As well as the areas of law, economy, education, the army, administration and security, which were considered priority fields in which to implement reforms, the *tekkes* were also considered one of the institutions requiring innovation. In this respect, Mahmud II intervened in the affairs of the Sufi orders for political reasons. In order to construct his “enlightened despotism” and to infringe upon the independent profession of the Sufi class, the sultan declared two important imperial edicts dealing with the dervish lodges, in two direct cases of intervention. The first edict in 1812 was composed of four matters:

1. The central lodge (*tekke*) of a given order should be the one where the eponym of the order is buried, and the administration of the order’s affairs should be organized from there.
2. Those sheikhs’ positions vacated upon the death or departure of the previous sheikh should be filled by appointment of the central *tekke*, and the views of the *Sheikh-iil-Islam* should be sought.
3. In the appointment of sheikhs, attention must be paid to the authority and capacities of the individuals. The appointment of

unqualified sheikhs through bribery, gifts, and so forth must be prevented.

4. The foundation of the *tekkes* must be under the administration of the *Evkaf Nezareti*.¹²

It is understood from this edict that the dervishes lived in the *tekkes*, and they advised and pronounced the profession of God's unity. This imperial edict did not touch upon the responsibilities and duties of the dervishes within the lodge. However, their hitherto administrative and financial autonomy was being eroded as they were being incorporated into the sphere of state governance.¹³ The ultimate aim was to take provincial *tekkes* under the control of the centers, so that the control mechanism would work without state intervention. In other words, the declaration of such an edict meant that the regulations of *tariqas* and *tekkes* were worse than initially supposed, and that the state tried to emphasize indirect control in the provinces through the central *tekkes*. Certainly, the *Sheikh-ül-Islam* had been demonstrated as the primary authority over the whole *tariqas* in the empire, since they were pointed out as the supreme authority for the appointment of the sheikhs. This was a great bureaucratic attempt to cut the direct ties of the *tariqa* with the sultan, and to bind the Sufi orders to the scrutiny of the office of the *Meşihat* (the *ilmiyye* hierarchy of the *ulema*). From now on, the Sufi orders were reduced to being an institution of the state similar to other institutions operating under the administration of state rules and regulations. The edict also aimed to prevent fake dervishes from misleading society. Furthermore, these regulations re-structured the authority of the sheikhs in the *tekkes* on a new, legal basis.

Undeniably, the standards of the orders deteriorated as their income levels decreased. Due to the income and prestige the lodges provided, those who wanted to acquire power in society could build up dervish lodges. Many provincial rulers would receive petitions and complaints about fake dervishes, who were exploiting Ottoman subjects. In fact, the ultimate objective behind these and subsequent reforms could be viewed as an attempt to initiate and comprehend the process of bureaucratizing the religious establishment, and to create a distinction between affairs of state and religion. In fact, there were no specifically appointed administrative bodies to deal with the issues of the Sufi orders until the *Tanzimat* reforms. The central Sufi order (called *Asitane*) was responsible for solving disputes and sustaining functions related to the *tekkes*. The order's close contact with the palace and with the *Sheikh-ül-Islam* was also efficient for their administration. The

Tanzimat reforms brought administrative interference in *tekke* regulations as well as abolishing certain privileges introduced to *tekke* employees.

In order to continue with the reforms of Mahmud II and to avoid certain malpractices which had occurred within the administration of the *tariqas* and among the members of the order, some further measures had to be taken, such as requiring a diploma for appointment to the office of sheikh, the banishing of disobedient Sufis, and the closure of the lodges. Subsequently, Mahmud II declared another imperial edict in 1836, which was composed of seven matters dealing with the internal regulation of the lodges and dervishes;

1. Each member of an order should wear a garment particular to that order
2. Each dervish has to carry identity cards, with the signature and seal of his sheikh.
3. Certificates of authoritative knowledge of the order's traditions (*icazetname*) must not be conferred to unqualified dervishes, and, when they are to be conferred, the opinions of not one but several sheikhs must be sought.
4. In the appointment of sheikhs, attention must be paid as to whether the candidate is indeed a member of the order associated with the foundation deeds.
5. One person may not hold more than one position as sheikh.
6. Items belonging to the *tekke* such as banners, flags, and musical instruments must not be removed from the premises, not even on the pretext of "sending off Hajj pilgrims" or "receiving returning ones."
7. Those who do not participate in the canonical worship (*namaz*), in recitation of tawhid (devotional) dhikrs, but merely wish to attend the "song and dance dhikrs," must be excluded.¹⁴

This was a great step towards changing the function of the *tekkes* in the nineteenth century. It is understood from this imperial edict that there were people who came to the lodge for the practice of *deveran* and *raks zinciri*, or those who were accommodated within the institution. However, the edict also mentions the social life of the *tekkes*, and makes many efforts to bring this under closer inspection and control. This was part of a broader

project to render more visible and calculable an ever-increasing number of micro-level, daily social practices and institutions, mainly by requiring that they be registered by a legal order. Hence, this edict transformed the authority of sheikhs, hitherto legitimated by tradition, into authority of a rational-legal type. The authority of the sheikh should be recognized, in legal terms, as the reflection of the rational application of the state power. In fact, these articles resulted in the placement of the Sheikhs in positions marginal to the administration of the *tariqa*. Also, the legality of a sheikh having tenure as the head of a *tariqa* came to be obtained through the legal agencies.

The decrease in the income level of the *tekkes* might have had an influence on these changes. Those Bektashi members who survived the prohibition secretly continued their activities, and the palace was not able to surveil them easily. The edict was passed in order to fulfill the monitoring activities of the state. In addition, the compulsory implementation of special clothes and identity cards were signs of an attempt towards the execution of a clear-cut standardization of the structure of the *tariqas*. This enforcement aimed to not only unveil state control over religious orders, but also to diminish the dominance of them over society. In fact, *The Encyclopedia of Islam* states that the *tekkes* may have functioned as an intellectual center, a sanctuary-offering asylum, as well as a political focus. In this respect, the edict indicates the awareness of the center that the popularity of the religious orders in society may have resulted in special and significant political consequences. It is worth keeping in mind the revolt of Sheikh Said against the central authority in 1925. Martin Van Bruinessan claims that Sheikh Said could not have managed to mobilize such a variety of people or warriors had it not been for the *Naqshibandiyya* network, and the belief of people in his holiness.¹⁵ Hence, it is safe to claim that the crucial consequence of the edicts was to diminish the visibility of the religious orders on social and political issues as a determining factor.

As far as economics is concerned, Mahmud II inaugurated several reforms in order to marshal the resources of the state for a better administration. He began to implement his reforms in 1813 through fundamental changes in the administration of pious foundations. Firstly, he united the administration of the *Hamidiye* and *Mahmudiye Evkafı* with the *Zarbhane-i Amire Nezareti* (the Imperial Mint) in 1813.¹⁶ He expanded the imperial *evkaf* with the abolishment of the janissaries, and therefore had to create a larger office in order to administer these vast, new state holdings. He established the *Evkaf-ı Hümayun Nezareti* in 1826 and the former *Zarhane Naziri* (the deputy of the Imperial Mint), Elhac Yusuf Efendi, became the first *Evkaf-ı Hümayun Nazırı* (the deputy of the Imperial Estates).¹⁷ With this act, he aimed to incorporate all *nezarets* into one expanded *nezaret*, namely

the *Evkaf-ı Hümayun Nezareti*. The Sufi orders were also affected by this financial regulation, and in this way, their revenues were henceforth to be collected by the state and redistributed to the *tekkes* as an income. The rationale behind this was to benefit efficiently from the waqfs, and to decrease the power of the religious interests which dominated these foundations. Sultan Mahmud also reduced the amount of gifts and financial aid provided to the dervish lodges in order to accommodate travelers, the dervishes themselves and their sympathizers. He was deliberately forming a state whereby religious foundations would ultimately be subordinate to and form a part of the Finance Ministry.¹⁸ The object of this accumulation of estates under one ministry was to put an end to the misappropriation of the funds and other abuses, which had been rife under the separate ministries. Robert Barnes argues that the main motivation of the Sultan in creating the *Evkaf-ı Hümayun Nezareti* was that “it was imperative for the Sultan to rectify the state of affairs by creating a central administration for all *evkaf* throughout the empire in order to obtain the revenue of *miri* lands which had been diverted to other ends.”¹⁹ Therefore, the land, which had belonged to the state, was given back and remained in the hands of the state. Moreover, the growth of the Ministry of Imperial Estates increased in proportion with the development of Mahmud II’s power and absolutism; it was established as a fully independent ministry only after the destruction of the janissaries.²⁰

The reason for these economical and political changes was to guide the large waqf incomes to the State Treasury. The greater control over the waqf also provided a crucial basis for financial centralization. The waqf institutions, in general, had become a branch of the bureaucratized state. The result of these measures, however, deprived many dervishes of their livelihood: “while the dervish orders continued to survive into the early twentieth century, dispossessed of their revenue they were little more than a feeble reflection of the impressive institution they once were.”²¹

The relations between the Sufi orders and the bureaucracy began to change with the abolition of the janissaries in 1826 and with the formation of *Evkaf Nezareti*. In fact, the obliteration of the janissaries was crucial in order to enable the success of the modernization and bureaucratization efforts led by Mahmud II. Using the cases of Patrona Halil and Kabakçı Mustafa rebellions as examples, Mahmud II wanted to eliminate any kind of resistance to his reforms. Selim III had tried to apply the reforms immediately and directly on traditional lines in the military, administration, economy and society. His attempts were regarded by the existing state elites as a threat to their political and financial power, and they resisted them and even rebelled against the Sultan, resulting in his deposition in 1807 and assassination the following year.²² On the other hand, Mahmud II approached the state elites

cautiously, earning the support of ruling elites and preparing a climate for his critical reforms. He waited for eighteen years to pass before undertaking his radical and crucial changes in state rule, notably the elimination of janissaries. He then made his lunge, which would result in the elimination of the provincial notables from intervening into the state administration.²³ *Sened-i Ittifak* was another step in his attempt to bind the provincial notables to the central authority by agreement, in order to end their powerful and even exploitative acts on the state in the provinces. Furthermore, it was not enough to issue the reforms; their success depended on their continued application, which was only possible with state offices and bureaucrats with a high-quality level of education. Additionally, intellectuals who supported the reforms and who were eligible to be educated and to educate should be won to the state branches. Aware of this fact, Mahmud II attempted to establish a European style of education, though without the elimination of *medreses*. He also made primary education compulsory and free, and set up *Rüşdiyes* (to educate students in Harbiye and Tıbbiye) and *Mekteb-i Maarif-i Adli* (to train the state officers).²⁴

Reviewing these reforms, one can claim that traditional societies like the Ottoman Empire determine their particular patterns of change. Max Weber points out that ruler and religion are the main sources of change in empires,²⁵ and claims the attempts of Mahmud II as a great example of this; both in the framework of his personal achievements in the reforms and of incorporating religion (in the form of the Sufi orders) into this process.²⁶ The patterns of social change in the empire were determined by the sultan and his perception of reform. The transformation of the Sufi orders was not only the result of the sultanic will, but was also affected by the intellectual outline of the *mürids*. All the attempts at reformation, from the reign of Selim III onwards, bore fruit in 1839 with the *Tanzimat* Edict.

3. The Sufi Orders in the *Tanzimat* Era

The reforms issued before the *Tanzimat* were mostly carried out by internal dynamics under the direction of the Ottoman sultan. However, compared to the reforms limited by the life span of the sultans or the reformists of the pre-*Tanzimat* era, the *Tanzimat* reforms were structural, fundamental and profound. They were like the struggle between the *Bab-ı Ali* and *Divan-ı Hümayun*, and the reforms concluded with the consolidation of the dominance of bureaucracy over the ruling class around the Sultan. These reforms can also be defined as bringing the Ottoman state back, in the respect that the administration reorganized in both the center and the provinces. They were the regulation of the “fine-tuning” of the administration of the Ottoman

Empire.²⁷ The differentiating feature of the edict was the interference of external dynamics on the internal perception of the necessity of modern, even secular rules and regulations for state mechanisms and social order. Mustafa Reşit Pasha was aware of the significance of “civilization” for the improvement of the Ottoman state and society and of the fact that political, economical and administrative reforms were crucial steps to cope with the Western powers and to catch up with the level of contemporary civilization. It is important to note that modernization and westernization are often used synonymously. However, compared to westernization, modernization is culturally neutral.²⁸ Here, the term “modernization” will be preferred, since the Ottoman reform movement understood its project as modernization rather than westernization in its general framework. The will to reform was not only absorbed by a small sector of Ottoman society; nor was the process of reformation one of “westernization,” thereby alienating “traditional lines.”²⁹ On the other hand, somewhat ironically, the *Tanzimat* Edict also represents the Islamic derivations of the empire. In other words, in the roots of the *Tanzimat* Rescript, there are impacts of orthodox Islam expounded by one of the leading Sufi orders within the Ottoman borders, namely the *Naqshibandiyya*.³⁰ Although the *Tanzimat* tried to bring a relatively secular organization to issues of social life, the Islamic roots of the edict appeared in clear, experienced and voiced elements. First, Islam had been employed as the legitimizing symbol for the popular recognition of the edict. Over time, this Islamic foundation became noticeable, especially at the end of the nineteenth century during the reign of Abdülhamid II. For the 19th century, Butrus Abu Manneh claims that when Sultan Abdülmecid rose to the Sultanate, both Palace and Porte were under the influence of orthodox Islam propounded by the *Naqshibandiyya* order. Indeed, there were crucial political players in the Palace and Porte who were both under the influence of the *Naqshibandiyya* order and had close relations to the Sultan; Adile Sultan who was the sister of Abdülmecid, Eyyubi Abdullah Efendi, who was reciter of the Qur’an in Palace, Mustafa Izzet who was the *muezzin* (the one calling Muslims to prayer) of the Palace and even Valide Sultan was affected by the teachings of the order, since it expected its members to abide by Sharia precepts. Therefore, one can argue that the *Naqshibandiyya* order sought influence and prosperity with its sheihks and *murids* in order to ensure the supremacy of the Sharia in the state and thus to bring justice and righteousness into the acts of state bureaucrats. In this respect, during the preparation and declaration, in stating the protection of life, honor and property, the edict was also employing the commands of Sufi Islam. The idea that justice brings security, that security proposes prosperity for subjects and land, and that prosperity is a precondition for loyalty and devotion for the

ruler and the community is a major argument in the *Gülhane* Rescript.³¹ Therefore, loaded with Sufi Muslim thought and modern political concepts, the *Tanzimat* Rescript targeted the Ottoman public in order to secure the continuation of the empire. With the union of Palace and Porte, the *Tanzimat* did not deviate from Islamic principles. However, the regulations which followed the edict caused difficulties in social and economic aspects of Ottoman daily and the political life of the Sufi orders, after 1850 in particular.

The *Tanzimat* did not initially target the *tekkes* and the Sufi orders, because Sultan Mahmud had taken necessary steps in order to structure and determine the place of the orders in Ottoman society. The *Tanzimat* era had an unpleasant impact on the majority of the dervish lodges in terms of financial sources in order to provide more state control over the orders and the endowments. Since the beginning of the *Tanzimat* in 1839, the revenues of the dervishes, whose sole means of support was tithe revenue, had been taken over by the state treasury. Moreover, the government abolished all the incomes of the dervishes and lodges until the latter were registered in state offices or if their dervishes were not recognized as genuine. Those *tariqas*, which were not recognized and certified, were closed down and those who were members of them were prohibited from opening their own *tekkes*. State and bureaucracy collected all the control and power in their hands in order to prevent *tekkes* and *tariqas* from acting independently, which would shake the authority and balance of power among the branches of the state. In addition, the *Tanzimat* and pre-*Tanzimat* reforms did not permit the Sufi orders to establish an organization among themselves, but bound them to the authority of a higher ranking officer in order to maintain the balance of power among them.

In some cases, dervish families remained without income. If they petitioned the state about their condition of shortage, they were provided with a monthly salary enough for their survival. These petitions were examples of unequal center-periphery power relations, and signs of a powerful state. The state provides those in need with food and shelter only if they recognize the supremacy of the state. In this respect, petitions are the textualized voices of peripheries or subjects showing the authoritative tune of the *Tanzimat* state. A petition of 1855 treats the death of Hüseyin Efendi, a sheikh of *Naqshibandiyya* order, after which his wives were reduced to a state of destitution and subjected to severe financial hardship. The reason for their poverty was that the sheikh had left no inheritance. After the death of the sheikh, his income was taken over by the treasury based on the application of the *Tanzimat* edict. The family of the sheikh had to petition to the government for support and accordingly they gained a monthly salary of 100

kurush as compensation.³² This is a great example of a “responsible” and “protective” regulation for a state in the progress of modernization.

Government policy toward the *tekkes* and dervishes was a direct takeover and control of their revenue. Dervishes became salaried state officials, and *tekkes* were dealt with by the *Meclis-i Vala* during the *Tanzimat* period. The *Meclis-i Vala* became the crucial agent in deciding basic needs, food supply and financial aid for the Sufi orders. İlber Ortaylı defines their relationship as follows; “[the] state provided patronage and advice, while *tekkes* leant on the state.”³³ Ortaylı claims a reciprocally pragmatic relationship between the state and the *tekkes*. While the state provided protection for them, and also utilized them as agents for its reputation. *Tekkes* reserved their prestigious condition in society to some extent, but the bureaucrats of the 19th century did not put as much pressure on the Bektashis as on others. The reason for the great anxiety about them was the fact that the Bektashis had “provided the janissaries with spiritual sustenance and popular support since early times.”³⁴ In fact, the janissaries had had the responsibility for public security, police duties, fire fighting, and the regulation of agricultural production and trade within the markets of the capital. As they were a crucial part of Ottoman financial and social life, Sultan Mahmud had to weaken the corps of the janissaries, which was a central focus of his modernization efforts in the military sphere. Therefore, after the elimination of the janissaries, the order was abolished just a month later, and its buildings were destroyed or distributed to the branches of the *Naqshibandiyya* order. It is worth noting that the order did not come directly from the sultan, but from the *Sheikh-ül-Islam* for political reasons. Since the suppression of a Sufi order might have resulted in disturbance among the conservative sectors of Ottoman society, the charge was carried out cautiously by the religious authorities. In fact, the assembly was composed of the leading dignitaries; the grand vizier, the two *Kazaskers* of Rumelia and Anatolia, the members of the *ulema* religious class, and the sheikhs of the *Naqshibandiyya*, the *Kadiriyya*, the *Halvetiyya*, the *Mevleviyya* and the *Shadiyya* orders.³⁵ They were supposed to rally around orthodox Islam and to gather the true doctrines of Islamic mysticism, since the Bektashis were believed to have departed from the way of *Hacı Bektashi Veli* who was the founder of the Bektashi order. The final decision was to penalize the acts of Bektashi *tekkes*, which were regarded as being against the Qur’an and Sunna. An imperial edict was declared on the 4th of *Zilhicce* 1241/1826 stating the punishment of these kinds of Sufi organizations through the political authorities. The Rescript ordered the closing of the Bektashi *tekkes* in Istanbul and in the provinces. The rest of the buildings were converted into mosques, schools and

medreses.³⁶ The dervishes themselves were exiled to Anatolia under the patronage of other *tariqas* in particular.

By the time the Bektashi order was dissolved, the implemented state policy towards the Sufi orders was to put direct control on their incomes. By a decree in 1840, the revenues of the dervish lodges were no longer to be administered independently, but regulated and collected by state officials, who were appointed by the government.³⁷ Another move of the Ottoman state towards all *tekkes* and *zaviyes* was to set forth legislation regarding the local administration, according to *Tanzimat* principles, of lands, arable fields and villages assigned for the provisioning of all *tekkes* and *zaviyes*:

All lands, arable fields, and villages recorded in the *deftter-i hakani* and tied to *dersiye* fees for education, and which were assigned in the times of the former sultans for the support of the poor and dervishes of all *tekkes* and *zaviyes* in the regions within the province of *Tanzimat* administration will hereafter not be administered independently, but, like all other *evkaf* attachments, *zeamet* fiefs and *mukataat* shares which are held in common and that are mixed with state lands, will be administered by local officials.³⁸

So, even the autonomous control of Sufi dervishes of their own waqfs and incomes were taken away by taking them into the possession of the state. As mentioned before, the *Tanzimat* reforms ended the supernumerary donatives given by the provincial governors for the support of the dervishes. For instance, the income of the *Halvetiyya* Sheikh Hüseyin Efendi came from the *Halvetiyya* Order in *Yozgat kaza* in the province, and was cut off by the *Tanzimat* regulations, because the profits of the provincial governors were revoked. However, the same decree donated an additional 30 kurush to the monthly salary of the dervish, paid by the state.³⁹ The significant point is that the salaries were paid by the treasury, not by the provincial governor or by the revenue of the *vali*.

Another decree shows the takeover of the *Tanzimat* of the given *tayinat* during the Ramadan month to the *tekkes* and Sufi lodges. This is exemplified by a decree on the *Siroz Mevlevihanesi* in 1842. According to this decree, eight *okka* of coffee, forty *okka* of oil and honey, and six bushels of rice, previously allocated to the *Mevlevi tekke* in the sacred month of Ramadan, were cut off after the declaration of the *Tanzimat*, and it was declared that additional money was to be given to the dervishes instead.⁴⁰

All these regulations demonstrate the fact that the state tried to put complete control of the administration and financial supervision of the Sufi orders in the hands of responsible officers. Also, in terms of fees, appointments to offices within the *tariqa* and its administration would only be approved and effected by the state.

The *Meclis-i Vala*, as the supreme legal authority in the empire, set strict control over the *tekkes* and *tariqas*; it appointed certain sheikhs to certain *tekkes*, or played an advisory role in the appointment of dervishes. The financial support, as well as the supervision of the appointments, proved that the state wanted to weaken the power of the *tekkes* and to restrain their independent status within society. An edict of 1860 by the *Meclis-i Vala* commanded that all guests sheltered under the roof of the *tekke* should be recorded, in order to prevent vagrants in dervish or student clothes from taking advantage of the *tekke* facilities.⁴¹ Ortaylı argues that most of the *tekkes* and dervishes were taken under a hierarchical supervision through financial aid, so that the state could be witness to all the acts of the lodge members, to the extent that they could only fulfill their traditional, political roles, including their social leadership, in accordance with the state's permission.⁴²

It can be argued that a functional relationship developed between the state and the Sufi orders, and that state agencies had organizational continuity, including the continuity of the central authority's position, as a result of the involvement of the state in the well-being of the *tariqas*.

The second consequence of the *Tanzimat* was the decline of the Sufi orders because of the process of secularization, which occurred in the Ottoman Empire in the mid-nineteenth century. The changes in outlook implied a decline of interest in mystical life and left an impression on many of the Sufi orders, which gradually ceased to be active, and finally completely disappeared.⁴³ The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries experienced an active attack on the Sufi orders based on misgivings about the orders, such as the idea that they were likely to form a site of resistance to progress. However, in the Ottoman Empire, the actions of state and government had already suppressed the powerful position of the orders in society, because they adopted the principles of religion and mysticism in the sphere of learning and worship. However, the movement of change in the nineteenth century was a process by which a social and cultural system dominated by religion changed into an organization in which each sphere of life, such as science and art political and economic activities, society and culture and morality and religion became autonomous.⁴⁴

4. The *Meclis-i Meşayih*: The Sheikhs as Bureaucrats

The last development in the nineteenth century, and the concluding development of the reforms of Sultan Mahmud and the *Tanzimat*, was the institution of the Council of Sheikhs (*Meclis-i Meşayih*) in 1866, in order to centralize the oversight of the orders' affairs. The assembly was established in Istanbul as a body reporting to the offices of the empire's chief *mufti* (the *Sheikh-ül-Islam*).⁴⁵ The establishment of the assembly coincided with the tenure of a *Sheikh-ül-Islam* who was known to have had close relations with Sufism and the Sufi Orders: Refik Efendi.⁴⁶

The assembly was the direct outcome of the efforts to amend the activities of the sheikhs. The main aim of the council was to undertake the administration and the supervision of all *tariqas* in the Ottoman Empire. The assembly was tied to the office of *Meşayih* and took on responsibility for the administration and the inspection of all Sufi orders in the Ottoman capital, Istanbul. For the provinces, they launched the *Encümen-i Meşayih* (the Council of Sheikhs) to carry out these functions. It was composed of the *mufti* and two sheikhs of the regions.⁴⁷

The *Meclis-i Meşayih* also took crucial measures of spiritual and organizational improvement regarding the Sufi orders. The Council not only changed the method of appointments in the orders and of education within the *tekkes*, but also paved the way for their politicization. It should be noted that the most significant impact of the Council, which became a governmental body in the hands of the *Sheikh-ül-Islams* and *muftis*, was the fact that all *tekkes* lost their privileges and exemptions. The founding of the assembly saw the routinization of bureaucratic procedures in the appointment of the sheikhs. Whereas the *evladiyet* (when a sheikhs' post passed to one of his sons) or the *hilafet* (when a sheikhs' post passed to another authorized figure) were employed as the primary methods on the death of a sheikh, the assembly introduced the methods of *imtihan* (examination of the information of Islam, and of the tradition and practices of particular order) and *icazetname* (diploma) as the essential documents for the nomination of a sheikh. However, the sheikhs were still allowed to practice other functions such as *imamlık*, and *muezzinlik*, as previously. The assembly of Sheikhs lasted until 1917 with some special changes.⁴⁸

The most important difference of the assembly from the edicts of Mahmud II in 1818 was the fact that while the decree of 1812 had begun to reorganize the *tekkes*, based on hierarchical orders such as the central and the provincial, the assembly attached the *tekkes* to the central ones not according to their affiliation but based on their geographic location.⁴⁹

5. Conclusion

The Ottoman Empire did not introduce any new ideological contribution to Sufism, but bestowed a theoretical flourishing to the people through the *tekkes* and their relationships with the *tariqas*. The Sufi orders gained institutional settlement and social vitality in their relatively independent practices and beliefs in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. Urban populations, including foreign nationals, increased with the predomination of Muslims in the 1850s.⁵⁰ Between 1820 and 1921, the number of *tekkes* in the city also increased.⁵¹ The nineteenth century witnessed crucial changes in the structure of the Sufi orders and in their relations with the state. The Ottoman Reforms of the orders were intended not to “repair the religion” or as part of a “westernization process,” but to strengthen the empire and the functioning of its institutions. In this empowerment, the Sufi orders were transformed into fully-fledged bureaucratic institutions in which political approval, protection and support were endowed by the hand of the state. This was a direct outcome of a modernizing trend in Islam towards more systematized and controlled administration to prevent abuses of the system, and to repel the doubts about the mystics of Sufism, as well as being part of a new Ottoman governmentality. Finally, all procedures regarding the bureaucratization and modernization of the Sufi orders were settled and bounded to strict regulations. Sufi practices were increasingly subjected to the normativities of the state mechanism.

Notes

¹ Butrus Abu-Manneh, “The Islamic Roots of the Gulhane Rescript”, *Die Welt des Islams*, n.s., 34, (1994), 173-103; and Benjamin Fortna, “Islamic Morality in Late Ottoman ‘Secular’ Schools,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 32 (2000), 369-93.

² Stanford J. Shaw, *From Empire to Republic: The Turkish War of National Liberation 1918-1923 A Documentary Study*, Vol I, (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 2000), 18.

³ İlber Ortaylı, “Tanzimat Devrinde İdari Yapı”, *Osmanlı Devleti ve Medeniyet Tarihi*, E. İhsanođlu ed., (İstanbul: İslam Tarih, Sanat ve Kültür Araştırma Merkezi, 1994), 286-7.

⁴ John Robert Barnes, *An Introduction to Religious Foundations in the Ottoman Empire* (Leiden: Brill, 1987), 72.

⁵ Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Timar", *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, Vol 12/1, (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1970), 286-7.

⁶ Mehmet Genç, "Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikane Sistemi", *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi Semineri*, ed. O. Okyar, Ü. Nalbantoğlu (Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi, Sosyal ve İdarî Bilimler Fakültesi, 1977), 231-3.

⁷ For the pact with the *ayan* see Halil İnalcık, "Sened-i İttifak ve Gülhane Hattı Hümayunu", *Bellekten*, Vol XXVIII (October, 1964), 603- 90.

⁸ For further information see, İ. Hakkı Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, Vol IV, (İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1972), 109-111; Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, C.V., 144-150; S. Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye*, Vol II, 20-1; Bernard Lewis, *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1970), 79-81; Taner Timur, *Osmanlı Çalışmaları*, (Ankara: Verso A.Ş., 1989), 117-150; Tuncer Baykara, "Yeniçeri Ocağının Kaldırılmasının Sosyal Sonuçları", *Sultan II. Mahmud ve Reformları Semineri*, 28-30 Haziran 1989, (İstanbul, 1990), 147-156; Godfrey Goodwin, *The Janissaries*, (London: Saqi, 1997).

⁹ Mehmet Seyittanlıoğlu, "Yenileşme Dönemi Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilatı," *Türkler*, Vol 13, (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2002), 561-76.

¹⁰ Mehmet Genç, "İltizam", *Türk Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi*, VOL. XII, (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1988), 57.

¹¹ For further information, see, Frederick De Jong, *Turuq and Turuq-Linked Institutions in Nineteenth Century Egypt: A Historical Study in Organization Dimensions of Islamic Mysticism*, (Leiden: Brill, 1978).

¹² Mustafa Kara, "Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Tasavvuf ve Tarikatlar," *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. IV, (İstanbul: İletişim, 1985), 982.

¹³ See John F. Barnes, "The Dervish Orders in the Ottoman Empire", in *The Dervish Lodge: Architecture, Art and Sufism in Ottoman Turkey*, ed. Raymond Lifchez (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 42; and

Barnes, *An Introduction to Religious Foundations in the Ottoman Empire* (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 92-101.

¹⁴ Mustafa Kara, "Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Tasavvuf ve Tarikatlar," 983.

¹⁵ Martin van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan* (London: Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Zed Books, 1992), 211.

¹⁶ "Evkaf-ı Hümayun," İstanbul Prime Minister's Archives Documents, 25.

¹⁷ "Evkaf-ı Hümayun," 26.

¹⁸ John Robert Barnes, *An Introduction to Religious Foundations in the Ottoman Empire*, (Leiden: Brill 1986), 83.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid., 92-101.

²² Ahmet Cevat Eren, "Selim III", *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. X, 441-7.

²³ In fact, this is the crucial difference of centralizations issued by Mahmud II and by Abdülhamid II. Sultan Mahmud II solidified his rule by setting aside provincial notables from state rule and regulation, while Abdülhamid II tried to incorporate these notable into state mechanism under his control to consolidate his power.

²⁴ Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, 109.

²⁵ Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, Vol I, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 73-5.

²⁶ Sabri Ülgener, on the other hand, claims that the religious nature of the Ottoman Empire, namely Islamic dynamics, resulted in immutable situation for the Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries because of the heterodox İslam and the mystical tradition embedded in it. F. Sabri Ülgener, *Dünü ve Bugünü ile Zihniyet ve Din İslam Tasaavuf ve Çözülme Devri İktisat*, (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1981). Ülgener, however, neglects and

undermines the transformation of both state mechanism and religious institutions, especially the Sufi orders in the nineteenth century.

²⁷ Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains; Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876- 1909* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), 10.

²⁸ Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Modernization and Social Change*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 7.

²⁹ See, "Introduction: Towards a New Urban Paradigm" in *The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire*, ed. Jen Hanssen, Thomas Philip and Stefan Weber (Würzburg: Ergon in Kommission, 2002), 4.

³⁰ Butrus Abu-Manneh, "The Islamic Roots of Gulhane Rescript," *Die Welt Des Islam* 34, no. 2 (Nov., 1994).

³¹ *Ibid.*, 196.

³² BOA/ A. }MKT.UM../ 232/ 7/ 02/Ş /1272 (1855).

³³ İlber Ortaylı, "Tarikatler ve Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Yönetimi," *OTAM*, (1995, no: 6), 285.

³⁴ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 33-4, 76

³⁵ Mehmed Esad Efendi, *Üss-i Zafer* (Istanbul: 1293/1876), 208.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 209.

³⁷ Barnes, *An Introduction to Religious Foundations in the Ottoman Empire*, 92.

³⁸ BOA, Cevdet-i Evkaf, No: 538, Gömlek No: 27168/ 29/C /1256 (1849). "Bütün tekke ve zaviyelerin taamiyelerin meşrut kura, mezari ve arazinin tanzimat usulünce mahalli idaresi tarafından taşrii."

³⁹ BOA, Cevdet-i Evkaf, No: 16327, 20 N 1257 (1841).

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- ⁴⁰ BOA, Cevdet-i Evkaf, No: 17095, 5 CA 1258 (1842).
- ⁴¹ BOA, Meclis- i Vala Evrakı, Dosya No: 114, C 1276/ 1860.
- ⁴² Ortaylı, “Tarikatler ve Tanzimat Dönemi Osmanlı Yönetimi,” 286.
- ⁴³ Spencer Trimingham, “Chapter IX,” *The Sufi Orders in Islam*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 249.
- ⁴⁵ İrfan Gündüz, *Osmanlılarda Devlet-Tekke Münasebetleri* (Ankara: Seha Neşriyat, 1989), 205; Mustafa Kara, *Din, Hayat ve Sanat Açısından Tekkeler ve Zaviyeler* (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1980), 301-18; Thierry Zarcone, *Mystiques, philosophes et francs-maçons en Islam, Rıza Tevfik, penseur ottoman (1868-1949) from Sufism to brotherhood*, (Paris: Institut français d'études anatoliennes d'Istanbul; Librairie d'Amérique et d'Orient Adrien Maisonneuve, Jean Maisonneuve Successeur, 1993), 139-43.
- ⁴⁶ Refik Efendi was affiliated with the Naqshibandiyya order by a deputy of Mevlana Khalid, the Sheikh Abdulfettah Akri, when he had been sent to Syria for an official duty. For further information, see, Kara, *Tekkeler ve Zaviyeler*, 303.
- ⁴⁷ Bilgin Aydın, “Osmanlı Devleti’nde Tekkeler Reformu ve Meclis-i Meşayih’in Şeyhülislamlığa Bağlı Olarak Kuruluşu, Faaliyetleri ve Arşivi,” *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* 7 (1998), 98.
- ⁴⁸ For the text of the 1917 reorganization, the *Meclis-i Meşayih Nizamnamesi*, published in *Takvim-i Vekayi*, see, Kara, *Tekkeler ve Zaviyeler*, 389-43.
- ⁴⁹ Aydın, “Osmanlı Devleti’nde Tekkeler Reformu ve Meclis-i Meşayih’in Şeyhülislamlığa Bağlı Olarak Kuruluşu, Faaliyetleri ve Arşivi,” 96.
- ⁵⁰ Stanford Shaw, “The Population of Istanbul in the Nineteenth Century,” *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 10, (1979), 266.
- ⁵¹ Klaus Kreiser, “Medresen und Derwischkonvente in Istanbul: Quantitative Aspekte”, *Economies et sociétés dans l’Empire Ottoman (fin du XVIIIe-*

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E. Melek Cevahirođlu Ömür is a PhD student in the Department of History at Bođaziçi University.